Dr. Joseph Jedwab
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
MPhil, DPhil, Oxford
Office: Old Main A301
Office Phone: 610-683-4767
Office Hours: MWF 11:00 AM-12:00 PM TH 12:00-1:00 PM
My doctoral work was on the metaphysics of the Trinity and Incarnation, in which I argue for a particular account of each doctrine. The problem on which I focus concerns the number of mental subjects: that is, things that have mental properties. Is there in the Trinity one subject (i.e. God) or three (i.e. the divine Persons)? Intuition pulls both ways. But if we say there's one subject, how are there three divine Persons? And if we say there are three, how is there one God? And is there in the Incarnation one subject (i.e. the Son) or two (i.e. the Son and the individual human Nature he assumes)? Again, intuition pulls both ways. But if we say there's one subject, how are there two Natures? And if we say that there are two subjects, how is there one Person? I argue that it can be that some subject has two or more disjoint sets of mental states or events each of which suffices on its own to make that subject a person so that the subject is two or more persons-like and has all of value in there being two or more persons. I develop a one-subject account of the Trinity on which there's one divine subject who has three disjoint sets of mental states and so has all of value in there being three persons. And I develop a one-subject account of the Incarnation on which one divine subject becomes humanly embodied and so becomes a human through only one of the sets of mental states it has. I argue that this combination of a three-sets one-subject account of the Trinity and a one-set one-subject account of the Incarnation does overall more justice to the central claims of these doctrines than any rival.
I teach critical thinking, introduction to logic, symbolic logic, introduction to religious studies, philosophy of religion, and metaphysics.